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4THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS
A Preliminary Note by Wesley C. Mitchell 1
THISbook is one of the series which has resulted from the
cooperation of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes
and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The pub-
lication of the two volumes on Recent Economic Changes
carried the study of a major business cycle through its up-
ward phase. This report provided a point of departure for
the investigation of the complex and remarkable economic
processes which the next phase, the ensuing depression,
revealed. The opportunity thus afforded and the urgent
need to interpret the phenomena of the depression decided
the Committee to continue its explorations. It wished to
examine, against the background of the research presented
in Recent Economic Changes, the perplexing inter-acting
factors of the depression itself, and to develop a rationale
for the comprehension and appraisal of these factors. The
comparative aspects of the situation, the contrast of post-
War and pre-War changes, were illuminated by F. C. Mills
in Economic Tendencies in the United States. In Strategic
Factors in Business Cycles J. M. Clark provided an analysis
of the broad relationships of the various causal factors. The
present study is directed to the dynamic factor the varia-
'Three Directors of the National Bureau, Messrs. George 0. May, George
E. Roberts and Malcolm C. Rorty have given generous help to the writer
of this note. He is heavily indebted also to Professors Ralph C. Epstein,
Frederick C. Mills and Horace Secrist as well as to Mr. Solomon Fabricant.
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tions of which dominate the direction and extent of business
enterprise, viz., profits.
Like other studies in the series, this one was made pos-
sible through funds contributed by the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, the Economic Club of Chicago, the Carnegie Corpora-
tion and a group of socially-minded citizens. To these and
specifically to the members of the Committee on Recent
Economic Changes: Arch W. Shaw, Chairman; Renick W.
Dunlap; William Green; Julius.Klein; John S. Lawrence;
Dr. Max Mason; Honorable A. C. Miller; Lewis E. Pier-
son; John J. Raskob; Samuel W. Reyburn; Louis J. Taber;
Daniel Willard; Clarence M. Woolley; Owen D. Young;
E. E. Hunt, Secretary; grateful appreciation is expressed.
Business profits are one of the hardest kinds of income
to measure. Any business enterprise should be able to state
accurately the sums that it has paid out in the course of a
year as wages, interest and rents; it should be able to state
also what income it has paid out to its owners. But the
profits of the enterprise itself are not definite sums fixed by
past transactions. On the contrary, they are appraisals of
net changes in the position and prospects of the business
as a whole—appraisals that look forward to the uncertain
future as well as back to the irrevocable past. Like all mix-
tures of past history and future anticipatiOns, statements
of profits are necessarily subject to variable margins of
uncertainty.
Besides ascertaining the difference between actual receipts
for whatever the business has sold and actual payments for
whatever commodities and services the business has bought,
the accountant who is estimating income must put values
upon all the property belonging to the business. What will
the raw materials, goods in process and finished products
realize when sold? What part of the accounts receivableTHE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[5]
willprove uncollectable? What will the holdings of shares
in other business enterprises be worth? If the enterprise
owns franchises, patents or other income-bearing rights,
what allowances should be made for their approaching
termination? At what rate is the physical plant depreciat-
ing? Is it becoming obsolete faster than it is wearing out?
Are there wasting assets for which a depletion charge
should be made? Has the business other properties, such
as lands or long-term contracts, that are growing more
valuable or less valuable? What part of the profits flows
from current operations such as will probably be continued
and what part from 'capital gains and losses', such as the
sales of securities owned by an enterprise, or the redemp-
tion of its own obligations at less than face value? Is the
profits estimate to be made on the assumption that the
enterprise will continue in business, or on the assumption
that it will liquidateaffairs?
Questions like these call not only for technicalskill
but also for good judgment. Hence statements of profits
are affected both by accounting methods and by the opti-
mistic or pessimistic light in which the future is viewed at
the time when the accounts are made up. So important a
matter as making allowance for depreciation was often
neglected by American corporations in the pre-War days
and some inadequacy in this respect may still persist.2 The
In testifying before the Federal Trade Commission, March 22, 1918, Mr.
George 0. May, who had practiced accounting in this country a little over
twenty years, said: "...inthe early days of my experience here I lost a
great deal of work because I refused to sign accounts as being correct unless
they provided for depreciation." lie thought the development of proper prac-
tice in this respect had been "more or less general... duringthe last ten
or twelve years." This development he attributed to the influence of public
accountants, to the Federal Trade Commission and even more to the Federal
tax upon corporation profits adopted in1909. See Testimony be/ore the
Federal Trade Commission to Determine the Maximum Selling Price of
Newsprint Paper. Price, Waterhouse and Co., New York (no date),pp. 2,
25, 26.[6] INDUSTRIALPROFITS
influence exercised by business 'sentiment' upon profit state-
ments is harder to gauge; but no one who compares the
reports issued by corporations to their stockholders in Janu-
ary 1929 and January 1933 can doubt that this factor also
affects the figures, though itsinfluence may be hidden
among the data used by the accountants in making valua-
tions.
It follows that a statistician who is trying to measure
profits must be critical of his basic data. It is risky to com-
pare income statements from American companies in pre-
War years with statements drawn up since public account-
ants and the Federal income tax have done their educational
work. Even in dealing with recent statements, the statisti-
cian cannot take it for granted without inquiry that the
figures are proper. The basis on which the valuations in
the income statement (as contrasted with the records of
actual transactions) have been made may be open to ques-
tion. Another question concerns the line between profits and
other types of income. Sometimes the partners in a firm
or the executives of a corporation draw salaries less than
they might command on a strictly commercial basis, and
the 'profits' reported contain part of the 'wages. of super-
intendence'. Sometimes the executives get compensation
larger than they could obtain from corporations in which
their stock holdings were relatively small, so that the
'profits' are understated. If an attempt is made to discrimi-
nate between pure profits and interest, the investigator must
ask what amount of capital has been invested in the business
and what is a proper rate of interest to allow. Even when
no such line is drawn, the amount of the investment must be
ascertained if rates of return are to be found. Finally since
profits as figured in practice depend partly on accruals and
deferred items, a competent income statement drawn up at
the end of a year may turn out to be seriously in error.THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[7]
Unforeseen changes in collections, in prices, in competitive
conditions, in market demand, in replacement costs may
raise or lower the values set upon the receivables, the in-
ventory of stock on hand, the securities owned and even
the physical plant. No doubt these changes will affect the
next year's accounts, but new errors of forecast may vitiate
this statement in its turn. A minutely accurate record of
profits cannot be made up until the last transaction in the
life of a business has been completed, and by that time the
earlier records are likely to have disappeared!
How grave the inaccuracies of business income state-
ments really are no one can say. Probably they are subject
to a secular decline and to cyclical fluctuations; at a given
time they must vary widely from enterprise to enterprise
and may vary somewhat from industry to industry. The
relative size of the items upon which an accounting valua-
tion has to be placed and of the items that are matters of
record is a crucial point. Often the valuation items are rela-
tively few and susceptible of fairly accurate estimate, so
that the margin of error in the profits reported for a given
year can be kept narrow. Moreover, a statistician may claim
that in a large sample of income statements there will be
more or less offsetting of unduly liberal against unduly
conservative figures.
It is pedantic, however, to treat profit statements as if
their significance depended wholly upon their accuracy. To
take that view would be to misconceive the role that profit
statements play in modern life. They are made primarily
as guides to future action. However difficult the task and
uncertain the result, every business man who wishes to plan
intelligently must make periodical attempts to ascertain
whether his past policies have been successful, where they
have left him at the moment, and what his prospects seem
to be. Perfect accuracy is not attainable, but for working[8] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
purposes itis not required—a fair approximation serves
most practical needs. Anyone who wishes to get some insight
into modern economic life must accept this situation as it is.
The profits reported by business enterprises influence di-
rectly the policies of the enterprises themselves, of bankers
and of investors; indirectly they influence the fortunes of
the whole community. These influences are not diminished
by the possibility that the reports of profits may turn out
later to have been decidedly over-optimistic on the whole
or over-pessimistic. Hence the uncertainties attendant upon
all statements of profits do not lessen the practical impor.
tance or the theoretical interest of collecting and analyzing
whatever sample statements can be had.
A second difficulty in the way of measuring business profits
is that they are the most variable of the income streams.
An individual's income from wages cannot fall more than
100 per cent; the profits of a business enterprise may, and
often do, turn into losses. The National Bureau's latest
estimates of national income paid to individuals show a fall
of 40 per cent between 1929 and 1932; wage disbursements
in the industries for which proper data are obtainable fell
60 per cent.3 But according to another National Bureau
study, based upon the figures of the Internal Revenue, the
aggregate net income of all corporations in the United
States, except tax-exempt and life insurance companies, suf-
fered an even more catastrophic fall in the same period.
Net profits of nearly eight billion dollars in 1929 were
succeeded by net losses of over three billion in 1931 and of
nearly five billion in
See Simon Kuznets, National Income, 1929—32; Bulletin 49 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, January 26, 1934), Table 2.
See Solomon Fabricant, Recent Corporate Profits in the United States,
Bulletin 50 (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1934), Table 1.THE PROBLEM OF PROFITS[9]
In dealing with certain problems—for example, business
cycles—it is necessary to stress these violent fluctuations of
profits from one year to the next. But in dealing with other
problems it is necessary to work through the short-period
oscillations to representative averages covering a longer
run. That is clearly the case if one seeks to ascertain what
return business enterprises realize over a period upon their
investment, or if one asks what price society as a whole
pays for the capital employed in supplying its needs.
Questions of the latter sort are so often asked that it is
well to show in some detail why it is so difficult to answer
them. An investigator who attempted to find out what is
the average long-run return upon capital invested in Ameri-
can business would need a vast array of data. (1) His
sample of profits should cover a considerable term of years,
and this term should include average proportions of busi-
ness-cycle expansions and business-cycle contractions, both
of average intensity. (2) Even in the worst years some
enterprises make good profits, and even in the best years
some enterprises suffer heavy losses. To yield reliable results
the sample should contain a fair representation of the suc-
cessful and of the unsuccessful concerns. Furthermore, the
losses which result when businesses conclude particular or
final chapters of their life histories by liquidation, sale, or
drastic reorganization, are only in small part borne by
other going concerns and thus reflected in reduced averages
of business profits. The major portion of these losses falls
upon individuals and has its effect—substantial, but not
readily determinable on the basis of available figures—in
reducing the broad averageofreturnsto
The net income referred to is that left after payment of income taxes, but
before payment of dividends.
6ColonelM. C. Rorty adds this comment: The distinction between the
average rate of return of going businesses on their capital investment and
the corresponding average returns to investors on the money they supply is,[10] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
(3) If the business enterprises included in the sample change
materially from yea r to year, the investigator cannot tell
whether a given alteration in profits results from an altera-
tion in the earnings of business at large or from the shifting
character ofdata. This ambiguity in the results is re-
duced if it is possible to secure returns from an unchanging
list of enterprises. But the ambiguity cannot be wholly
eliminated in this way; for business enterprises are most
unstable units. Identity of name does not guarantee identity
of products, management, or ownership. (4) As the present
volume demonstrates more conclusively than any other in-
vestigation known to me, profits in certain industries may
remain relatively high for years at a time, while profits in
other industries remain relatively low. Hence the sample
should cover a wide industrial range. Indeed, the sample
should cover all important lines of investment if conclusions
are to be drawn concerning average rates of profits in the'
country. (5)Whilestatements of profit in millions of dol-
lars have much importance, they do not show what rate of
return a business enterprise gets, or what price society pays
for capital, unless the amount of profits is related to the
amount of the investment. Therefore, the sample should
contain statements concerning the capital used by every
enterprise every year, and these statements should separate
the capital belonging to the enterprise from capital bor-
rowed. The difficulties of getting reliable figures concerning
actual investments need not be enlarged upon. (6) After
perhaps, necessary, owing to the almost insuperable difficulties in the way
of determining the magnitude of unreported liquidation and reorganization
losses. However, it is important to note that, with this distinction made, an
adequate suppiy of capital for social needs can be assured onlyifthe
average of business profits of going concerns is substantially higher than
the rate of net return, whatever that may be, which is required to maintain
a continuing flow of new money from private investors. The social cost of
private capital is determined by the necessary net return to such investors,
rather than in terms of the Current earnings of going concerns.THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[11]
what was said above concerning the difliculty of estimating
profits, it is scarcely necessary to add that the investigator
would need to assure himself that the methods of account-
ing used in preparing his original data were sound at the
outset of the period covered and that they did not change
greatly in later years.
This formidable list of requirements for ascertaining
'the' average long-run rate of profits in all trades does
not mean that it is impossible to learn anything valuable
about business profits unless carefully audited income state-
ments can be had for an unchanging sample including tens
of thousands of successful and unsuccessful enterprises,
fairly distributed among all of the industries of a country,
continued for decades and supported by reliable records of
capital invested. But what can be learned is obviously con-
ditioned by the scope and character of the samples of profit
statements that can be collected. The paucity and the in-
definiteness of our knowledge of business profits is due to
the narrow range or the defective quality of the data that
have been available for analysis.
It has been hard enough to secure representative quota-
tions of commodity prices at wholesale over considerable
periods. Even today we have few price series for highly
fabricated products. In view of the vastly greater difficulties
of what profits are realized, and the common
reluctance to make income statements public, it is not sur-
prising that the volume of properly authenticated data has
not been sufficient to establish broad conclusions. But some
samples have been available for years.
Governmental supervision led to the compilation and pub-
lication of statements concerning the profits of National
Banks, later of interstate railroads, and later still of certain
other public utilities. Dependence upon the general market[12] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
for capital has led a growing list of corporations to publish
condensed statements of income; but there has been little
assurance that the accounting methods followed were suf-
ficiently uniform to guarantee the comparability of these
materials. Similar doubts have limited the usefulness of
the data concerning profits in Great Britain that have been
compiled for many years by the London Economist. A
promising step was taken by Mr. J. E. Sterrett when he pub-
lished carefully audited reports from 158 industrial com-
panies, largely small manufacturing concerns, for the calen-
dar years 1912 and 1913, or for the fiscal years covering
substantially that period. "During this time," Mr. Sterrett
held, "business conditions have been generally unfavorable
It may, therefore, be assumed that the profits earned
:havenot been more than a fair average...." The
average annual net profits shown by this sample were
13.67 per cent upon the capital Unfortunately,
the example set by Mr. Sterrett has not been widely imi-
tated. It is true that numerous studies have been made of
profits in particular industries; but the periods of time cov-
ered, the methods of stating profits, and the adequacy of the
samples used have varied so much that it is impossible to
make an adequate composite photograph by assembling
these individual sketches.1
The Comparative Yield on Trade and Public Service Investment, Ilmeri-
can Economic Review, March 1916. Compare the critique of the representative
character of Mr. Sterrett's average by M. C. Rorty in Some Problems in
Current Economics (Chicago, 1922), pp. 108—10. Many practical business
men, says Colonel Rorty, refuse to accept such figures. "They claim that a
study of 'going' concerns is meaningless and misleading, and that, if all the
legitimate ventures in any competitive industry were followed through from
birth to death, with full account taken of all gains and losses, the average
earnings on the invested money would very slightly, ifatall, exceed the
going rate of interest."
As examples of the literature, see the following books, reports and bul-
letins:
Horace Secrist, The Triumph of Mediocrity in Business (Northwestern
University, 1933)THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[13]
A far more comprehensive sample of American data was
started when the Federal government incorporated an
excise tax upon corporations having net incomes in excess
of $5,000 per annum in the tarifi act of August 5,1909.
The exemption of small incomes was dropped when the
excise provision was superseded by the income tax law of
1913. The compilations of income statements required by
these laws arid by numerous amending statutes have grown
into a formally continuous record of the net incomes of all
business corporations in the United States during a quarter
of a century.
Comprehensive as the income tax data are, they fall short
of what is desirable in several important respects. (1) Those
types of business which are carried on mainly by indi-
viduals or partnerships are under-represented, or even mis-
represented by the inclusion of a few non-typical corpora-
tions; for example, farming, most of all, repair work, the
professions and in considerable degree retail trade. (2) The
returns are regularly divided into two groups—corpora-
tions reporting net incomes and corporations reporting no
Keith Powlison, Profits of (lie National Banks (Richard G. Badger, 1931)
Ralph C. Epstein, The Automobile Industry (A. W. Shaw, 1928)
Laurence H. Seltzer, A Fitiancial History of the American Automobile
Industry (Houghton Muffin, 1928)
Melvin T. Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United
States (Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. viii, 1912)
Herbert Muller, Kosten-. und Rentabilitätsproblerne im deutschen und
amerikanischenBuchdruckereib etrieb(BetriebundUnternehmung,
Band 8, Leipzig, 1930)
CecilE. and GeorgesF.Doriot,Analyzing Our Industries
(McGraw-Hill, 1932)
Bureau of Business Research, University of Illinois, The Earning Power
Ratios of Public Utility Companies (Bulletin No. 15, 1927)
Federal Trade Commission, A Report on Prices, Profits, and Coin petition
in the Petroleum Industry (70th Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 61, 1928)
Department of Finance and Accounting, United Typothetae of America,
.1932 Ratios for Printing Management (1933, annual)
Bureau of Business Research, Harvard University, Operating Results of
Department and Specialty Stores in 1930 (Bulletin No. 85, 1931)[14] INDUSTRIALPROFITS
net income. It is not possible to ascertain accurately the
aggregate net income of all corporations by subtracting the
deficits of the second group from the profits of the first
group. For, as has been pointed out by George 0. May,
there is a certain duplication of losses in the income tax
returns which is not offset by a similar duplication of in-
come—this for the reason that the net income figures
exclude dividends received from other corporations; but if
one corporation loses money and fails, it will report its loss
directly, and other corporations which are its creditors or
stockholders will also report what they have lost by its
failure.8 Of course this duplication of losses in the returns
varies from year to year, being a much more serious matter
in 1921 and 1932, for example, than in 1919 and 1929.
(3) Changes in the law and in administrative rulings have
affected the amount of profits reported in successive years.
During the period of the excess-profits tax (1917—21)
profits were affected by several unusual factors. For ex-
ample, war contracts were let in many cases on highly
profitable terms, with the thought in mind that a major
fraction of the profits would be recouped through the tax.
On the other hand, large sums were spent upon advertising
or other plans for future expansion and charged as current
expenses.
One of the chief reasons why the profits reported in 1917
were so much larger than in 1918 is that in the former year
the tax was retroactive. Hence there was less opportunity
in 1917 than in 1918 to enter into transactions which would
reduce taxable income. In comparing 1917 with later years,
it should be noted also that the law has been made more
liberal to the taxpayer in important respects; for instance,
by allowing discovery depletion and by increasing depletion
8Seethe footnote in Recent Economic Changes in the United States (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), II, 854—5.TI-IE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[15]
allowance at large.9 (4) The classification of the returns is
inadequate. For example, the classification by size of net
income has varied from year to year, it is not available for
1919 and 1924, and is not crossed upon the classification by
industrial groups. The latter classification is not carried out
insufficient detail to answer many important questions.
There is no classification by total assets (except in 1931),
capital, gross income, net income (except in 1926), or any
other criterion indicating the size of the corporations.
(5)Thetaxable net income reported excludes, certain items
that an accountant or an economist would include in profits;
particularly, dividends received from other corporations
and interest upon tax-exempt bonds. In one of the following
chapters, an attempt to ascertain the relative magnitude of
these items is made. They appear to run on the average
about one-ninth of the taxable net income reported to the
government. (6) While the official reports show by 'major
industrial divisions' the assets and liabilities of most cor-
porations, a considerable number do not submit balance
sheets, and no attempt is made in the reports preceding
1931 to relate the amount of the net incomes to the amount
of capital invested. (7) The corporations included in the
tables change from year to year. Corporations that have
been wound up by bankruptcy or amalgamation disappear
from the list; newly-formed corporations appear. A cor-
poration that one year appears in the group reporting net
income may shift next year to the group reporting deficits,
and the year after may reappear in the first group. A stu-
dent of the returns has no means of knowing what part of
the fluctuations in profits is due tthese changes in the cor-
porations reporting and in the way they are classified.
The same. Compare the official statement of 'Changes in the revenue
acts affecting the comparability of statistical data from income tax returns
of corporations'; Statistics of Income for 1929, pp. 404—7.[16] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
As part of its work upon national income, the National
Bureau of Economic Research has had to estimate the
profits withdrawn by individuals from business enterprises
of which they are sole owners or partners, and the divi-
dends received by stockholders. In some of its estimates it
has ventured to include rough figures for corporate sur-
pluses. To attempt a systematic study of business profits is
a natural sequel of these earlier efforts. But the difficulty
of securing adequate samples of data has delayed that
undertaking.
Despite these difliculties, the National Bureau has been
able to secure the use of two bodies of sample data upon
profits, which, though they fall far short of what is desir-
able, merit study. One is a small collection of audited state-
ments secured through public-spirited action by the American
Institute of Accountants. Income statements and balance
sheets covering the years 1927—29 were obtained from 714
corporations. Of these returns the greater part, but not all,
were available in full detail for all of the corporations in
the list for each of the three years covered. Though no very
large corporations were included, the average book assets
of the concerns in the sample were between three and four
times the average net assets of all corporations submitting
balance sheets to the Internal Revenue in the years covered
($2,244,000 as compared with $643,000). The average
rate of earnings upon the equity of the stockholders during
the three years was 9.2 per cent.1°
The second sample, analyzed in this volume, consists of
materials made public by the United States Department of
Commerce in 1932, when it published in rotoprinted form
a Source-Book for the Study of Profits by Ralph C. Epstein
in collaboration with Florence M. Clark. While this official
report made available to specialists a relatively large collec-
10This collection of profits data may be published at a later date.THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[17]
tion of data concerning corporate earnings and investments
in the fields of manufacturing, trading and finance, it con-
tained no averages and no text aside from a brief preface
and list of definitions. To work up these materials into a
form useful to many people wasa task requiring much addi-
tional thought and labor, which Professor Epstein under-
took at the National Bureau's request.
The basic data underlying the first half of this report
include statements for the ten years 1919—28 concerning
the incomes and investments of 2,046 manufacturing cor-
porations, 664 trading corporations, 88 mining corpora-
tions and 346 financial corporations. In all four groups, the
same corporations are represented in each of the ten years
coverThis use of strictly identical lists of corporations
fo gives the present body of materials a
'age over the official Statistics of Income and
ientioned collection of audit reports. In ad-
has three sets of data concerning
'ely small corporations which vary in
'om year to year. One of these sets
othertwo cover 1924—28. The
in the 'non-identical' lists
inone case, from 406 to 1,118
in £,337 to 1,350 in a third.
A. .thebest authenticated and largest col-
lectiori .oncerning the profits of American
enterpris numerous non-regulated industries that has
been made. Its scope and representativeness are impressive
when subjected to detailed examination.
(1) in respect to the time covered, ten years is long
enough to permit considerable shifts among investments—
though of course, a longer series of records would be better.
According to the National Bureau's chronology of business
cycles, the decade 1919—28 contains 68 months of general[18] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
business expansion and 52monthsof general business con-
traction. The durations of expansions and contractions work
out 57and43 per cent. During the full period covered by
our American chronology (1855—1933), the corresponding
figures are 53percent for expansion and 47 per cent for
contraction. Of the three contractions in 1919—28, that of
1920—2 1 was very severe, that of 1923—24 was of average
Intensity, and that of 1926—27 was decidedly mild. The
expansion of 1919 was feverishly rapid; that of 1921—23
was of more than average vigor; that of 1924—26 was
quieter, and that which began in 1928 did not run to grave
extremes by the end of the year, except in stock-exchange
and urban real-estate operations.11 On the whole, I think
the character of the period gives the sample a slight bias in
the direction of over-average profits; but it might be diffi-
cult to select any other decade that is more representative
of 'long-run' conditions.
(2) A second question concerning the character of the
period concerns, not the volume of current earnings, but
the ratio of profits to book capital. Doubtless some of the
corporations in the sample were in existence before the
WTar. If these corporations did not 'write up' the value
of their. fixed investments when prices rose in 1915—20,
then profits in 1919—28, expressed as percentages of capital
invested, would tend to run on high levels. On th.e other
hand, the sample doubtless contains corporations that were
established or reorganized with a changed capitalization at
various times in 19 16—18, when the general level of prices
was high. It may contain other corporations that 'wrote up'
their fixed investments in 1919—20 to match the advance
of prices and earnings. If these corporations did 'write
down' their fixed investments after prices fell in 1920—21,
These judgments are based upon the National Bureau's as yet unpub-
lished studies of a large number of economic time series.THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[19]
then profits in 1921—28 would form relatively iow per-
centages of the capital invested. How important these two
distortions of the percentages are we do not know. That
they tend to offset each other is clear, but there may remain
a net bias towards high profit ratios or towards iow profit
ratios.
(3) The lists of identical corporations contain both en-
terprises having net incomes and enterprises having deficits.
But Professor Epstein points out that the proportion of
corporations having deficits in most if not all of his lists is
substantially lower than the proportion among the corpora-
tions reporting to the Internal Revenue. If the latter vastly
larger body of returns is fairly representative of average
experience, then the present sample tends to over-state
profits.'2 Further, the supplemental lists of non-identical
corporations contain only enterprises having net incomes
and tend to over-state profits for that reason.
(4) The use of reports from the same corporations year
after year reduces one grave doubt concerning the meaning
of the variations in profits as reported in the official Statis-
tics of Income. It is true, as said above, that the continuing
life of an enterprise is not incompatible with very consider-
SeeProfessor Epstein's critique of his materials in Ch. 43. Colonel M. C.
Rorty points out that the use of lists of identical corporations over a series
of years has a bias towards exaggerating profits, because it excludes all
corporations that go bankrupt within the period covered. When the period
extends over a decade, this factor becomes of considerable moment, par-
ticularly in the field of trade where, as Professor Epstein remarks, the
average life of corporations is relatively short. On the other hand, where
fixed investments are large, corporations of considerable size are seldom
abandoned, though often reorganized. It may be, however, that large corpo-
rations which suffer very heavy losses are more likely to be reorganized
under new names and so not to appear in a list of 'identical' concerns.
Of course Professor Epstein's sample excludes concerns coming into exist-
ence during his period as well as concerns going out of existence. This
exclusion may tend to depress the average profit rates. Compare the remarks
of Frederick C. Mills concerning the probable bias in a smaller sample of
identical corporations used in his Economic Tendencies in the Unijed Slates
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1932), footnote pp. 144—5.[20] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
able shifts in the nature of the business carried on. But only
those changes in industrial activities which go so far as to
call for the shifting of corporations from one group in the
classifications used to another group can affect seriously the
conclusiqns drawn. In Chapter 46 Professor Epstein shows
that there is no reason to fear grave distortion on this count.
(5) The industries covered include a wide variety of
manufacturing; ten branches of retail and eight of whole-
sale trade; mining and quarrying of coal, oil, metals, stone,
salt, clay, sand and gravel; banking of several types and
other financial business, except life insurance. No data are
presented for farming, construction work, transportation
and other public utilities, the practice of professions, com-
mercial amusements, hotels and restaurants. Considerable
as is the range of the data, they cannot, of course, be made
to reveal the average rate of return upon capital in the
United States, except upon the assumption that this average
is nearly the same whether the investment is made in one
industry or in another. That is an assumption which Pro-
fessor Epstein shows to be even more untenable than has
been supposed.
(6) How highastandard of accounting prevailed
among the corporations preparing the returns utilized by
the Department of Commerce in its Source-Book for the
Study ofProfitsthere is no way of telling. Probably the
larger concerns employed skilled auditors; many of the
smaller ones may have relied upon their own rather simple
bookkeeping. But the earliest of the returns included cover
1919. By that time the Federal income tax upon corpora-
tions had been in operation for several years and had
brought the advantages of proper depreciation allowances
home to all but the most careless of business men. As com-
pared with the data contained in the Statistics of Income,
Professor Epstein's results are better in that he includesTI-IE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[21]
two substantial items of non-taxable income—dividends of
other corporations and tax-exempt bonds. As said above,
careful analysis of a portion of the sample indicates that
these items increase net corporate incomes by about one-
ninth.13
(7) Another feature of the sample that bears upon its
representative character is pointed out by Professor Ep-
stein. All four of his lists of 'identical' corporations show
an average size larger than that of the corresponding groups
shown by Statistics of Income. For example, the 2,046
corporations in his manufacturing list make up oniy 2 or 3
per cent of the manufacturing corporations reporting to the
Internal Revenue in 1919—28, but they receive from 57 to
66 per cent of the total income. Similarly, the list for trade
represents less than 1 per cent of the number of reporting
corporations, but about 30 per cent of the income reported
in the official income-tax document. The supplementary use
of 'non-identical'lists of small corporations engaged in
manufacturing and trading redresses the balance in a de-
gree. But Professor Epstein makes clear that his sample
represents the earnings of large-scale business more fully
than it those of small-scale business.
If the sample included all corporations much double counting of income
would result from the inclusion of inter-corporate dividends, just as double
counting in the opposite direction would result from the subtraction of the
deficits of corporations that lost money in any year from the profits of cor-
porations that made money. Since the whole sample includes only 3,114
corporations in the 'identical lists', plus at most three or four thousand a
year in the 'non-identical'lists, and since 300,000 to 500,000 corporations
have reported to the Internal Revenue in successive years from 1919—28, it
may seem that double counting of income and losses cannot give rise to
serious error. But the proportion of corporations that both receive and pay
dividendsisprobably far higher among the3,114 corporations of the
'identical lists' than among the three to five hundred thousand that report,
and an appreciable sum of profits may appear twice in the sample. What-
ever double counting there is does not affect profit rates; for the value of
stocks owned by the corporations in the sample are included in the invest-
ments upon which the profit rates are figured.[22] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
(8)It may not be superfluous to add that data concern-
ing the profits of business corporations as going concerns
do not show what returns individuals receive upon their
investments in corporate shares. To establish upon a statis-
ticalbasis any conclusions concerning investors'profits
would call for data different from those utilized here and
a different method of analysis.14
This distinction, mentioned in an earlier footnote, between the profits
of investors in a business and the profits of the business itself seems to be
overlooked so often that it requires elaboration.
In good years, the dividends paid to stockholders are likely to be smaller
than the current profits of the business; in bad years dividends are likely
to be larger than profits; sometimes a corporation pays dividends while
itisincurring losses. Besides his dividends,a stockholder may receive
'rights' to subscribe to new issues of stock upon favorable terms—'rights'
that he can exercise or sell as he thinks fit. On the other hand, the stock-
holder may be assessed upon the value of hisshares, and so have a
negative income from them. Further, the stockholder may make profits for
himself, or suffer losses, from the purchase and sale of shares. He may have
the value of his shares wiped out wholly or largely by the liquidation of
the company or the sale of its assets; on the other hand he may have the
value of his shares much enhanced by an amalgamation on favorable terms.
Thus the sums received by the stockholders from their investments ina
corporation's shares differ from the profits of the corporation and cannot
be ascertained from the corporation's books. Likewise the amount invested
by the stockholders in their shares differs from the amount invested by
the corporation initsbusiness, except perhaps when the corporationis
launched or when there is no buying and selling of shares.
Since neither the investments nor the net gains of the stockholders equal
the investments or the net profits of the corporation, it is only by accident
that the rate of profits made by any investor equals the rate of profits made
by the corporation. Suppose that a corporation starts with a cash capital
of $100,000, makes profits of $20,000, distributes $10,000 in dividends, and
that its shares rise from par to 200. If one of the original stockholders sells
at that price, he receives 10 per cent upon his investment plus a capital
gain of 100 per cent; but if conditions remain unchanged the new holder
will get only 5per cent upon his investment. Suppose instead that our
corporation makes profits of 2 per cent, pays dividends of 1 per cent and
that its shares fall from par to 20. Then the original stockholder who sells
gets a meager dividend and suffers a heavy capital loss; but the new stock-
holder who buys at 20 may get 5 per cent upon his investment, like the
man who pays 200 for shares in a highly profitable business. Of course the
profits and losses of individual investors in business enterprises are related
to the profits and losses of the business enterprises in question; but this
relation is far from simple.THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[23]
What, then, can be learned from this notable collection
of data covering the profits of business enterprises?
Though the data do not suffice to show the average long-
time earnings of capital in the United States, they throw
some light upon that question which many ask and no one
can answer with full confidence. Professor Epstein shows
conclusively that, within the period and the industrial field
covered, his sample is biased in the direction of over-stating
Colonel Rorty offers the following observations:
"The question of the average earnings from diversified investments in
the common shares of legitimate business ventures is one that has been
debated at great length by investment experts. The majority opinion among
such experts is that, even with somewhat more than average skill in selec-
tion, a diversified list of investments at 'par' in new ventures will tend to
earn less, rather than more, than an equal investment at average market
prices in the shares of seasoned companies—or, in other words, that the
premium usually paid, above book values, for seasoned shares is no more
than an offset to the reduced risk. With respect to seasoned shares, there is
alsoasimilar majority opinion, supported by statisticalstudies,tothe
effect that the high rates of earnings on common share investments, so
extensively advertised during the 'new era', were based on the fallacy of
choosing the especially successful companies of a given date and calculating
the results from prior investments in such shares. Selections made (as in
practice they must be made) of the promising and popular issues of prior
dates, when carried forward for a term of years, have shown radically
lower rates of return. Long-term studies, covering periods of from 30 to 50
years prior to 1930, indicate that common shares in the United States could
be bought, at normal average market levels, to promise returns in cash
and stock dividends, rights, etc., averaging between 6 and 7 per cent, before
allowance for losses through failures, reorganization and other major ad-
verse developments. Opinions and experience as to the latter losses vary
widely. Barring purely speculative profits, or profits due to extraordinary
skillin selection, there are, however, few qualified observers who would
count on a net return in excess of 6 per cent, and there are many who
would set the net figure at 5, or even 4. per cent. These reduced figures
correspond to estimates of from 1 to 3 per cent per annum for major losses
which are generally unreported in income tax returns and current cor-
poration accounts.
So far as skilled estimates may be relied upon, the preceding figures seem
to indicate the range within which the true long-term return on investments
in corporation equities may lie, whether such investments be made at 'par'
in new ventures, or at a normal average market in seasoned issues. And
with very minor adjustments, if any, they would seem to represent, also,
the true long-term earnings on the actual investment in corporation equities,
after allowance has been made for all reported and unreported losses."[24] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
average profits. As said above, the years 1919—28 appear
to have been on the whole slightly more favorable to profit
making than an average decade drawn from the last eighty
years of American experience. More important is the fact
that corporations having deficits are not included in the
supplementallistsof small'non-identical'corporations
and are under-represented in the lists of large 'identical'
corporations; for corporations that survive for ten years or
more represent successful, or at any rate large-scale, busi-
ness rather than average business. Another factoi- that lifts
Professor Epstein's figures for profits above the official
returns is the inclusion of dividends from other corporations
and interest on tax-exempt bonds. Of course this inclusion
is a merit in the sample; but it may well be that large cor-
porations receive a larger percentage of their gross income
from such sources than do the under-represented small cor-
porations. If so, that fact does not affect profit ratios; for
security holdings make part of the base upon which these
ratios are computed.
Unfortunately, we have no means of determining just
how much the averages yielded by the sample over-state
profit rates. Of course that could be told definitely only if
we knew the average long-run rate of earnings upon capital
for all enterprises. Comparisons with other samples do not
settle the point, but they.are interesting. The grand average
rate of return which Professor Epstein gets for his 3,144
'identical' corporations in 1919—28 is 9.2 per cent after
Federal taxes are deducted. This figureissubstantially
lower than the average derived by Mr. Sterrett from his
small but interesting pre-War sample, namely 13.67 per
cent. It happens to be just the same as the average derived
from the National Bureau's collection of audit reports for
about 700 corporations in 1927—29. It is substantially higher
than the average which Professor Epstein himself gets fromhow far 9 per cent is above the
of business enterprises. The five
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Revenue are a changing list varyin
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THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS
the official income tax data for all corporations engaged
manufacturing,trade,finance and miningin1924—2
namely 6.2 per cent after the deduction of Federal taxes
But even this comparison with the average earnings
over 300,000 corporations for five years does not sh
'true' average earnings
years 1924—28 were a
profit making—slightly
ars covered by Professor
engaged in manufactur-
reported to the Internal
gin
of
cent in 1924—28, while the corresponding figure for the
changing list of corporations reporting to the Internal
Revenue comes out 6.1 per cent. And there we must leave
the problem.
However, too much stress can be laid upon the search
for the 'true' average rate of business profits. If we knew
that missing figure, we should have to say that it gives a
most inadequate representation of the facts of greatest sig-
nificance to business men and to the community as a whole.
See Table 1 in Ch. 2. The corresponding figure for Professor Epstein's
3,144 'identical' corporations is 9.4 per cent.[26] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
More important than the precise arithmetic or geometric
mean of earning rates over a long period of time are the
facts that the profits earned by business enterprises as a
whole fluctuate violently from year to year, that in every
year the returns to different enterprises cover a range run-
fling from very high profits to very heavy losses, that certain
industries remain relatively profitable and others relatively
unprofitable for years at a stretch, and finally that business
enterprises stabilize the disbursement of income to indi-
viduals in some degree by paying out dividends substantially
greater than current profits in bad years.
In a vague and general way these facts have been sur-
mised. But if we are to have the type of knowledge that
is most useful to investors, to business executives, to bank-
ers, to public commissions and courts concerned with regu-
lating rates of different types, to accountants, to economists,
to legislators.and to government officials, we must replace
our vague and general impressions as rapidly as may be by
definite measurements. This volume makes a significant
advance from the realm of personal opinion towards the
realm of established fact. The materials here analyzed con-
stitute the largest collection that has been published of well-
authenticated data concerning the profits of the same busi-
ness enterprises over a considerable period of years. 'Within
their field, the figures show definitely the wide differences
in the average profits made by numei-ous branches of busi-
ness, the persistence of these differences over a period suf-
ficiently long to admit of large shiftings of investments, the
range covered by the profits of individual enterprises in
numerous industries, the comparative profits of large, mid-
dle-size and small enterprises, the violent fluctuations of
profits from phase to phase of business cycles, the differ-
ences between profits on the stockholders' equities and the
tTI-IE PROBLEM OF MEASURING PROFITS[27]
returns upon this equity plus funded debt, and the differences
in profits before and after the payment of Federal taxes.
The findings presented here can be put to many different
uses and construed in various ways. One of their merits
is that they raise as many questions as they answer and in-
dicate what further work needs to be done in the field. The
publication of Professor Epstein's inquiry should stimulate
and guide the collection of larger samples of data concern-
ing profits and the more thorough analysis of existing data.